ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a novel secure role re-encryption system (SRRS), which is based on convergent encryption and the role re-encryption algorithm to prevent the privacy data leakage in cloud and it also achieves the authorized deduplication and satisfies the dynamic privilege updating and revoking. Meanwhile, our system supports ownership checking and achieves the proof of ownership for the authorized users efficiently. Specifically, we introduce a management center to handle with the authorized request and establish a role authorized tree (RAT) mapping the relationship of the roles and keys. With the convergent encryption algorithm and the role re-encryption technique, it can be guaranteed that only the authorized user who has the corresponding role re-encryption key can access the specific file without any data leakage. Through role re-encryption key updating and revoking, our system achieves the dynamic updating of the authorized user's privilege. Furthermore, we exploit the dynamic count filters (DCF) to implement the data updating and improve the retrieval of ownership verifying effectively. We conduct the security analysis and the simulation experiment to demonstrate the security and efficiency of our proposed system. INDEX TERMS Role re-encryption, role authorized tree, privacy leakage, authorized deduplication, proof of ownership.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of cloud computing and big data technology changes user's method and efficiency in processing information, the cloud servers provide the scalable computing and efficient storage to users in anytime and anywhere. Therefore, for enterprises and individuals, it will be a trend to outsource data to the cloud service providers (CSP) [1] , [2] . A report ''Internet data generated in one minute'' of Excelcom shows that more than 701389 accounts log onto Facebook in one minute, more than 300 hours new video and audio are uploaded to YouTube in one minute. The users generate 2.4 million search requests in Google search, and the users post more than 24.30 million photos to the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Kuo-Hui Yeh.
Instagram social application per minute [3] , [4] . The amount of global uploaded data reached 4 billion or more per day in 2011, the data volume reached 1.8 ZB. IDC (International Data Corporation) statistic shows that the global data volume reached 4.4 ZB in 2013, reached 8.61 ZB by the end of 2015, the growth rate of data volume is more than 50%, and expected to 2020, it will unexpectedly reach 44 ZB [5] . More than half of the cloud storage space is occupied by the duplicate data, and the expenditure for managing the duplicate data is 8 times that of the original data [6] . Along with the explosive growth of cloud data, massive duplicate data occupied the storage space and the huge expenditure bring a severe challenge to the limited cloud storage space. Therefore, how to reduce the management expenditure and improve the storage efficiency in cloud is an urgent issue to be solved for the cloud service providers [7] - [9] .
To tackle the above issue, data deduplication is widely applied in the cloud service providers, which eliminates the multiple duplicate data to improve the storage utilization and reduce management expenditure [10] . Recent research [11] shows that data deduplication can reduce up to 83% for backup systems and 68% for memory systems [12] . According to different criteria, the classification results for data deduplication have multiple types. Based on the data processing unit, it can be divided into file-level data deduplication and block-level data deduplication; based on the data execution object, it can be divided into server-side data deduplication (target-based data deduplication), client-side data deduplication (source-based data deduplication), and cross-user data deduplication [13] - [15] . The cross-user data deduplication can save more storage space, and the deduplication rate is up to 90%-95% [16] , [17] . Although data deduplication brings above benefits, it also poses some new security challenges [18] - [20] . Firstly, the data outsourced by enterprises and individuals to cloud service providers usually involves the privacy information [21] - [23] . The users lose the control over these privacy data, which exists the risk of privacy leakage by the curious cloud service providers [24] . At the same time, in order to improve the management efficient, the cloud server providers perform data deduplication to control the number of duplicate data. In the process of data deduplication, the adversary may utilize the relative attack methods to intercept the user's privacy information, which also discloses the user's identity, location, and number of duplicate data. Therefore, it is important to protect the user's privacy when performing data deduplication. Secondly, the data deduplication based on the traditional convergent encryption poses serious security problems, the unauthorized users can obtain the user's information only by supplying the hash value of the file, which makes it difficult to protect the data security, check the ownership and achieve authorization access. Only the user who has the corresponding privilege can access the specific file and perform the data deduplication in cloud, which is an urgent issue to be solved. Thirdly, the privilege of the authorized user is dynamic and flexible, it is difficult to guarantee the access permission of authorized user and achieve the key updating and revoking management when performing data deduplication.
To tackle the above issues, we propose a novel secure role re-encryption system with authorized deduplication called SRRS, which is based on the convergent encryption and the role re-encryption algorithm to achieve authorized deduplication. Up to now, we propose the first solution to prevent privacy data leakage, achieve authorized deduplication and satisfy dynamic privilege updating and revoking, meanwhile, support ownership checking. The main contributions of the proposed scheme are fourfold:
• We proposed a novel secure role re-encryption system (SRRS) with authorized deduplication in cloud, which is based on the convergent encryption to protect data privacy and achieve secure data deduplication, utilizes the role re-encryption to achieve authorized access. In SRRS, we introduce a management center to handle with the authorized request, and generate the role re-encryption key, which guarantees that only the authorized user who have the corresponding role re-encryption key used to access the specific file.
• We construct a role authorized tree to manage the user's role and implement the role re-encryption key updating and revoking efficiently, which satisfies the dynamic updating of authorized user's privilege.
• When performing the secure data deduplication, CSP can check the ownership of the authorized user. We exploit the dynamic count filters (DCF) to achieve the data updating and improve the retrieval efficiency of ownership verifying.
• Security analysis shows that our proposed system is secure under the proposed security model, and performance evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed system. The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section II gives the preliminaries in our work; and Section III describes the system model, adversary model and design goal; in Section IV, we construct the proposed system; Section V and Section VI gives the security analysis and the performance evaluation, respectively; We describe the related work in Section VII; and give the conclusion in the end.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give the preliminaries in our work about B+ tree and DCF.
A. B+ TREE B+ tree has two types of nodes: internal nodes and leaf nodes [25] . The internal node, including a root node, stores the index information, and the leaf node stores the elements related to data. All of the leaf nodes are linked by a doubly linked list. A B+ tree of order M satisfies the following properties:
• The root node has 2 child nodes at least, and has M child nodes at most.
• With except of the root node, each internal node has M − 1 key values at least, and has M /2 − 1 key values at most.
• Each leaf node has M /2 elements at least. B+ tree is a tree-like data structure that stores and searches data in order, which supports data searching, sequentially reading, insert and deletion. The non-leaf nodes of the B+ tree contain only index information, and do not store actual values. All leaf nodes and the connected nodes are connected by a linked list, which is convenient for interval searching and traversal. Those properties are used in the construction of role authorization tree to implement quickly querying and retrieving user's role information in the SRRS system. VOLUME 7, 2019 B. CONVERGENT ENCRYPTION Convergent encryption is a specific symmetrical encryption and provides data confidentiality in deduplication process [18] , [26] .
The key of convergent encryption is a value of a cryptographically strong hash calculating from the original file content. Therefore, two users with the identical plaintext files can get the identical hashes and identical keys to obtain identical ciphertext files without considering their encryption keys.
Formally, given a symmetric-key encryption function Enc, a plaintext file f and a cryptographically strong hash function h, the convergent key is k = h(f ), and the ciphertext C = Enc k (f ).
In the SRRS system, we employ the convergent encryption to protect data privacy and achieve secure data deduplication.
C. DYNAMIC COUNT FILTERS
A dynamic count filters (DCF) [27] is used to check whether a specified element is in a set, and consists of two different vectors and a series of random mapping functions. Compared with the standard bloom filter, DCF can handle deletes and inserts on multisets with less consumption and higher efficiency. Each element is mapped to an array used the hash functions. For the retrieved element, if all the mapping results are equal to 1, it exists in the set. Otherwise, it has not been in the set. However, the retrieved result has a certain probability of false positive.
The process of initialization, insertion, retrieval and deletion are described as follows:
• InitDCF(α, β, t) : CBF ← {CU i } i∈ [1,t] , OFV ← {OF i } i∈ [1,t] . Initialize a DCF, where t is the number of counters, each CU i has size of α bits, each OF i has size of β, where β varies dynamically its bit length.
• InseDCF(EM , γ ) : CBF ← {EM h j } j∈ [1,γ ] . Insert a new element EM , where {h j } j∈ [1,γ ] are γ independent hash functions, then, updating the CBF and OFV.
•
Retrieve whether the element EM exists in the set, the value of the i-th counters is V i .
• DeleDCF(EM , DCF) : CBF ← {EM h j } j∈ [1,γ ] . Delete an element EM , then, update the CBF and OFV. In the SRRS system, we obtain the encrypted blocks and insert the results to DCF to achieve the data updating and improve the retrieval efficiency of ownership verifying.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we firstly give a system model. Then, we describe an adversary model and our design goal.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of SRRS consists of three entities: Users (U), a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and a Management Center (MC), as shown in Figure 1 . A user sends a request to MC, and encrypts the original file, then, outsources the ciphertext to CSP. Users who belong to different role groups owning the corresponding role keys. According to the role keys and access control policies, the user can upload or download the specific files from CSP. The creator of a file is unique, and is also a special user.
A CSP is responsible for data storage, management and verification. CSP stores and manages the uploaded files from users. In terms of verification, CSP establishes a challenge list for each file to verify the user's ownership to prevent the unauthorized user's access.
A MC is a trusted third party, which is responsible for user authorization and role key management.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
In our proposed system, we assume that: 1 the MC is trusted by all entities involved in our system, and will not compromised by an adversary; 2 the CSP is ''honest-butcurious (HbC)'', which performs our proposed protocol honestly, but is curious about the user's privacy information; 3 the communication channel between MC and the user is secure in our system; 4 we define a secure hash function resisted against the collision attack and exploit the standard symmetric encryption algorithm [4] , [28] .
According to the above assumptions, we define the following abilities of different types of adversaries [29] , [30] .
• A 1 could eavesdrop the communications between CSP and the user to get the transmitted information, and plays a role of the user to interact with the CSP.
• A 2 could eavesdrop the communications between CSP and the user to get the transmitted information, and cloud exchange S min bytes information with the user.
• A 3 may discard the user's data that have not been accessed or rarely accessed, and may tamper the user's data to maintain reputation.
C. DESIGN GOAL
We consider two aspects of system security and performance efficiency to construct our system, therefore, the design goal includes security and performance requirement, which is described as follows:
• Our proposed system is secure under the standard model. Specifically, 1 the probability of an adversary running a successful secure protocol should be negligible under the secure parameter; 2 the privacy information of users cannot be acknowledged by the CSP in the process of performing data deduplication; 3 the adversary can obtain a minimum amount S min of the privacy information from the authorized user to run successful security protocol. Meanwhile, the system supports dynamic updating and revoking of privileges to achieve flexible access control.
• The bandwidth, the server memory space, the client storage space should be efficient and economical. In the process of performing authorized deduplication, the bytes of file exchanged between the user and CSP should be the smallest possible to reduce the communication overhead; the loaded information in the server memory should be the smallest possible and should be independent of the uploaded file size to reduce the memory overhead; the information about keys and ciphertext stored to the client should be the minimum possible, in addition, the number and length of the stored keys should be independent of the file size to reduce the storage overhead.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this section, we firstly give the notations and descriptions, as shown in Table 1 , and we define that '':='' represents a define operator, ''←'' represents an assignment operator. The overview of the proposed SRRS system consists of the following three phases: authorized deduplication (Phase 1), proof of ownership (Phase 2), and role key update (Phase 3), as shown in Figure 2 .
In phase 1, a file creator U 1 calls Divided algorithm to divide the file, then calls Encrypt algorithm to encrypt the file. MC calls rkeyGen algorithm to generate the role key, and calls Decomp algorithm to obtain the role key shares, then sends the role key and role key shares to the creator.
After receiving the information, U 1 calls ReEncrypt algorithm, and sends to CSP. In phase 2, U 2 uploads a file to CSP, CSP then finds that the same file has been stored, it will perform proof of ownership for U 2 . CSP generates and sends the challenge of the proof of ownership to U 2 , who calls Divided, Encrypt and ReEncrypt algorithms to compute response, and sends the response to CSP, CSP will perform Verify algorithm. U 2 downloads a file from CSP, who calls Verify algorithm and sends ciphertext to U 2 , U 2 then calls ReDecrypt and Decrypt algorithms to obtain the file. In phase 3, MC calls rkeyUp algorithm to update the role key, and CSP retrieves data information and updates date information.
A. ROLE AUTHORIZED TREE
We define a novel authorization structure named role authorized tree (RAT) based on a B+ tree, as shown in Figure 3 . MC organizes a role group using a RAT to manage the role key and achieve the user's authorization.
For a RAT with order M , each node contains M elements at most, and M /2 elements at least. A RAT has two type of nodes: leaf nodes and internal nodes, the root node belongs to the internal nodes. The leaf nodes store data information, and the internal nodes do not have these data.
We define a RAT with order 3, each node can store 3 elements at most. Each node V consists of three values, the definitions are described as follows:
• contain(V ). The contain(V ) stores the elements of this node based on the index from left to right, contain(V ) :=
The children(V ) stores the child nodes of this node, consists of left child, the middle child, the right child respectively, children(V ) :=
For a leaf node, the child nodes will be null, children(V ) = {null}.
• rank(V ). The rank(V ) stores the number of elements. For a RAT with order 3, each node can contain 3 elements at most, and 2 elements at least. Therefore, the rank(V ) can be described as:
rank(V ) = 2 the node has 2 elements. 3 the node has 3 elements.
We define the elements of the leaf node corresponding to the user's roles, each role group consists of a two-tuple R =< rolekey, filelist >, where R [i] .rolekey is the role key and R [i] .filelist is the list of file indexes, and i is the index of the role group. Each role group holds the corresponding role key and manages the corresponding files. The user who owns the particular role has the privilege to manage the corresponding files.
In order to obtain the role group and the corresponding role key, MC must search the RAT. To search for the role group R ι , MC needs to retrieve the element l ι . MC takes the retrieved role group R ι as input and returns the role key rkey ι , the procedures of search process are described as follows: Step.1: MC gets contain(·) and rank(·) from current node X i . If rank(X i ) = 2, MC needs to compare l ι with two elements x j , x j+1 of node X i ; If rank(X i ) = 3, MC needs to compare l i with three elements x j , x j+1 , x j+2 of node X i .
Step.2: MC checks children(X i ) to get the corresponding child node Y j based on the result of step.1.
Step 
B. ALGORITHMS
In this section, we elaborately describe all the algorithms in the SRRS system, as shown in Figure 2 .
Divided. The user executes the algorithm to divided the file into n blocks. It takes a file f and a file block number n as inputs, and outputs a set of file blocks {b i } i∈ [1,n] . Encrypt. The user executes the algorithm to encrypt the file blocks with the convergent key. It takes a set of file blocks {b i } i∈ [1,n] as input, and returns the ciphertext {C i } i∈ [1,n] . The user runs the hash over file blocks {b i } i∈ [1,n] to obtain the convergent key {k i } i∈ [1,n] , k i = h(b i ). Then, the user symmetrically encrypts the file blocks with the convergent key to obtain the ciphertext C i , C i = Enc k i (b i ), where Enc is a symmetric encryption function.
rkeyGen. It takes a user's role role u i as input, and returns a role key rkey j , rkey j = role u i .rolekey. The specific user u i is associated with the role key rkey j . Upon receiving an authorization request with the user's role, MC searches the node of RAT to obtain the corresponding two-tuple R[u i ], and returns the role key rkey j . Each role is associated with a unique role key and has the corresponding privilege.
Decomp. MC executes the algorithm to decompose the role key into n shares. It takes the role key rkey and key share number n as inputs, and returns a set of key shares {rkey i } i∈ [1,n] . The key share number is identical to the file block number.
ReEncrypt. It takes a set of ciphertext blocks and a set of role key shares as inputs, and returns the re-encryption ciphertext {C i } i∈ [1,n] . Upon receiving n shares of the role key {rkey i } i∈ [1,n] , the user concatenates the ciphertext blocks with the role key shares to obtain the re-encryption ciphertext
ReDecrypt. It takes a set of re-encryption ciphertext blocks and a set of role key shares as inputs, and returns the ciphertext {C i } i∈ [1,n] . Upon receiving n shares of the role key {rkey i } i∈ [1,n] , the user splits the re-encryption ciphertext blocks with the role key shares to obtain the ciphertext
Decrypt. The user executes the algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext with the convergent key. It takes a set of ciphertext blocks {C i } i∈ [1,n] as input, and returns the original file blocks {b i } i∈ [1,n] . The user decrypts the ciphertext with the convergent key to obtain the original file blocks,
where Dec is a decryption function.
rkeyUp. It takes an original role key rkey as input, and returns the updated role key rkey . MC searches the RAT and updates the specific role key, rkey → rkey .
C. AUTHORIZED DEDUPLICATION
In our proposed system, we define user U 1 as the creator of a file f and U 2 as one of the users that owns the same file. Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the procedure of authorized deduplication.
U 1 wants to store file f to the CSP, as shown in Figure 4 . Firstly, U 1 computes a token of f , token = h(h(f )), and sends an upload request with {token, id u 1 } to CSP. Upon receiving the token, CSP checks it, if it has not been stored, and requests U 1 to upload the file with related information. Secondly, U 1 calls Divided to obtain n file blocks, {b i } i∈ [1,n] , and invokes Encrypt to get the ciphertext C i = Enc k i (b i ), where k i is the convergent key of the ciphertext block, k i = h(b i ). Thirdly, U 1 sends the authorized request with {token, n, role u 1 } to MC. Upon receiving the request, MC searches the node from RAT to obtain the corresponding two-tuple R[u 1 ], and calls rkeyGen to generate the role key rkey. In order to obtain the role key shares, MC invokes Decomp, where inputs the role key rkey and the key share number n and returns a set of key shares {rkey i } i∈ [1,n] . Then, MC sends the result to U 1 . U 1 calls ReEncrypt to obtain the re-encryption ciphertext C ,
Upon receiving the data package, CSP establishes an associative array that maps a string with finite size to 3-tuples: The establishment of DCF is described as follows:
Step.1: CSP initializes DCF with the file block number n.
Step.2: CSP calculates the index [i] , that is the hash value of each block
Step
.3: CSP takes the index[i] and the index i as inputs, runs PRF to get the inserted element em, em ← PRF(index[i], i).
Step.4: An element em as the outputs of PRF is inserted into DCF, InseDCF(em, γ ).
CSP repeats from the Step.2 to the Step.4 until i = n, the encrypted blocks are inserted into DCF.
U 2 wants to store the same file at the CSP, as shown in Figure 5 . U 2 computes a token of file, token = h(h(f )), and sends the upload request with {token, id u 2 } to CSP. Upon receiving the token, CSP checks if the token has been stored, then checks if id u 2 ∈ [token].ID is true. If the result is true, CSP informs U 2 that the file has been stored. If not, CSP implements PoW protocol to check the ownership of U 2 , and returns the corresponding result to U 2 (PoW protocol refers to Sect.4.4).
U 2 wants to download the file stored in the CSP, as shown in Figure 5 . U 2 sends the download request with {token, id u 2 } to CSP, CSP checks if id u 2 ∈ [token].ID is true. If the identifier of U 2 exists in the user list, CSP retrieves the associative array based on the index value of token and returns the re-encryption ciphertext C . U 2 sends the role key request to MC, and calls ReDecrypt using the role key to decrypt the re-encryption ciphertext C . Finally, U 2 calls Decrypt using the convergent key k to obtain the original file f .
D. PROOF OF OWNERSHIP
In order to solve the problem that an adversary can explore some sensitive data simply by supplying the hash values of a file, CSP implements PoW protocol when one of users uploads file that has been stored. We define U 3 is one of the users who owns the file f , and f has been stored in the CSP, meanwhile, the identifier of U 3 has not been stored in the list of owner identifier, as shown in Figure 6 . U 3 computes a token of f , token = h(h(f )), and sends the upload request with {token, id u 3 } to CSP. Upon receiving the token, CSP checks whether the token has been stored or not, then checks whether id u 3 ∈ [token].ID is true or not. After verification, the token has been stored at CSP and id u 3 does not belong to the identifier list. Therefore, CSP generates an array pos of J randomly and independently chosen block indexes based on [token].ENC. Finally, CSP sends pos to U 3 , where pos is a challenge to verify a user who indeed owns f .
Upon receiving the challenge, U 3 calls Divided to get n file blocks, {b i } i∈ [1,n] , and invokes Encrypt to get the ciphertext C i = Enc h(b i ) (b i ), and interacts with MC to obtain re-encryption ciphertext C . Then, U 3 calculates the corresponding responses res according to the pos and returns the result to CSP. Finally, CSP takes res and pos as inputs, calls PRF to get a retrieved element em, and checks whether the em belongs to [ 6: generates the challenge; 7: sends pos and J to the user; 8: (@User): calculates the response; 9: Divided(f , n) → {b i } i∈ [1,n] ; 10: Encrypt({b i } i∈ [1,n] ) → {C i } i∈ [1,n] ({C i } i∈ [1,n] , {rkey i } i∈ [1,n] ) → {C i } i∈ [1,n] ; 13: for j ← 1 to J do 14: res [ 
E. ROLE KEY UPDATE
MC manages RAT to update the role key. Through role re-encryption key updating and revoking, our system is able to achieve the dynamic updating of the authorized user's privilege.
The update operations contain the modification of role keys and the updating of RAT. For a RAT, the elements of leaf node are corresponding to the role information. Based on the properties of B+ tree, the modification of role keys only affects the nodes along the path from a wanted element of a leaf node to the root node on the RAT. Therefore, the modification of role keys is equal to search for a wanted element of the leaf node. The update operations include Modification, Deletion and Insertion, which mostly conform to the procedures of a standard B+ tree [25] , [31] .
MC wants to update the role key rkey, it firstly calls rkeyUp to obtain the updated role key rkey , and sends the update request with a set of {token i } i∈ [1,l] to CSP. CSP retrieves the associative array based on the set of token, and returns the corresponding re-encryption ciphertext {C token i } i∈ [1,l] to MC. Upon receiving this information, MC calls ReDecrypt used rkey to decrypt C , C token i = C token i −rkey, then, calls ReEncrypt used rkey to obtain the updated re-encryption ciphertext C , C token i = C token i +rkey . Finally, MC uploads a set of {C token i } i∈ [1,l] to CSP. Upon receiving the updated ciphertext, CSP retrieves the corresponding [token].DCF, runs DeleDCF and InseDCF to update the DCF. All the processes are shown in Algorithm 3.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed SRRS under the adversary model (defined in Section III.B) based on the standard model [29] .
A. SECURITY OF AUTHORIZED DEDUPLICATION
In the standard model, we propose a security formulation for the authorized deduplication scheme.
Theorem 1: Suppose the expression: ε 1 > ε 2 = 2λ + (λ) is satisfied. We define that h represents a collision-resistant 14: for k ← 1 to l do 15: for v ← 1 to n do 16 :
17:
DeleDCF : CBF ← {em h t } t∈ [1,γ ] ; 18 :
19:
InseDCF : CBF ← {em h t } t∈ [1,γ ] ; 20: end for 21: [token k ].DCF ← DCF ; 22: end for return { [token i ].DCF} i∈ [1,l] ; hash function, and E is an encryption scheme with semantic secure. The proposed authorized deduplication scheme is (ε 1 , ε 2 )-secure. Proof: Any PPT adversary who attempts to attack our proposed scheme is defined as A SRRS , we define that A 1 is a PPT adversary, who attempts to attack the encryption scheme E. A 1 has obtained a re-encryption ciphertext C = E.ReEncrypt(rkey, C), C = E.Encrypt(h(f ), f ), without any information about the role key rkey and the input message f . We define ε 1 > ε 2 ≥ λ, and the min-entropy of the message C is at least ε 1 bits, meanwhile, the adversary A 1 is allowed to learn at most (ε 1 − ε 2 ) bits information of message f from the challenger. Though querying the oracle O f , the adversary A 1 can learn any output of Func(f ), where the PPT function Func(f ) is selected by A 1 .
Based on the above definitions, the adversary A 1 simulates a security game G Sim , which is described as follows:
Setup. A 1 obtains the index value token = h(h(f )) and sends it to A SRRS .
Learning-I. A 1 queries to the oracle O f with Func(f ), and obtains the corresponding response q = Func(f ), where the bit-length of output q is required to be small than (ε 1 − ε 2 ). Upon receiving q, A 1 forwards the response to A SRRS .
Commit. Denote a subset of {x i } i∈ [1,y] 
Though querying and learning from the oracle O f , the adversary A 1 can obtain at most (λ+ε 1 −ε 2 ) bits message about the unknown f . Therefore, the unknown f has at least (ε 2 − λ) = λ + (λ) bits min-entropy.
Theorem 1 is proved, our proposed SRRS is (ε 1 , ε 2 )-secure.
B. SECURITY OF PROOF OF OWNERSHIP
Theorem 2: Let S min is the least byte exchanging with a colliding user, a PPT adversary succeeds in a PoW for file f with negligible probability, our proposed proof of ownership is (S min )-secure.
Proof: We construct a PPT adversary A 2 against the PoW protocol, who does not possess the entire file. p is the probability of A 2 knowing a byte of the file f at a randomly chosen position, and g is the probability of A 2 guessing correct when he doesn't possess the given byte.
We define that the event bl i is A 2 passing the protocol when he is given a token, the result happens in either of the following two cases: 1 A 2 gets a correct token; 2 When DCF checks the element, a false positive occurs. We define the false positive of DCF is p f . Through the above analysis, the probability of the event bl i can be described as:
The cloud server uses the token as a seed to generate the index with PRF. Therefore, we define that an event token i is A 2 generating the bits of the i-th token, the event ϕ i is A 2 knowing the i-th block. According to the mathematics knowledge, the probability of A 2 obtaining the correct block is g B , and guessing the l-bit output of H 5 is 0.5 l . Obviously, the size of token is shorter than block, guessing the token is easier for A 2 . That is, g B 0.5 l . Therefore, the probability of the event token i can be described as: Then, we can obtain:
The challenge contains J independent block positions, the probability of A 2 passing the challenge is described as:
We set up a security parameter κ to derive a lower bound for J , that is P(success) ≤ 2 κ , as:
Therefore, the probability of A 2 running a successful PoW protocol should be negligible under the security parameter κ, and the privacy information of users cannot be acknowledged by the CSP in the process of authorized deduplication.
We ensure that the adversary A 2 obtains at least S min bytes of the privacy information from the legitimate user, which can run a successful RSE-PoW protocol. According to the definitions of token and block, we know that token is shorter than block, therefore, we set the token length as:
For the performance goals, the communication bandwidth of our proposed scheme is related to the security parameters, we use the small exchanged file between user and CSP to achieve the security goal of authorized deduplication. Furthermore, the server memory overhead is also related to the security parameters and is independent of the uploaded file size, which achieves the goal of reducing server memory overhead. The role key is assigned by MC, the key size stored in client is independent of the file size, which achieves the goal of reducing the client storage overhead.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we give the performance analysis and evaluation of our SRRS.
A. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
We compare our proposed SRRS system with the related schemes in terms of the efficiency and computational complexity, and the result is summarized in Table 2 and Table 3 .
For the comparison of the efficiency, we give the communication overhead and storage overhead of the related works. Upload message size refers to the communication overhead of the file upload phase between the users and CSP, download message size refers to the communication overhead of the file download phase and proof of ownership phase between the users and CSP, rekeying message size refers to the communication overhead of the key updating phase and ciphertext updating phase between the user (or MC) and CSP, key size and token size refer to the storage overhead that the user required to store respectively.
In the upload phase, both Xu's scheme [29] and Hur's scheme [32] exploit the randomized convergent encryption to obtain the ciphertext. In order to realize the decryption, the randomized key needs to be uploaded. In our SRRS system, the key is related to the role that managed by the MC, and it does not need to upload. In the download phase, our system performs proof of ownership to realize the authorized access, S PoW is the size of exchanged information in our proposed PoW protocol. In the key updating and ciphertext updating phase, Hur's and our SRRS system support the rekeying, the communication overheads of the rekeying are (x − y)log x x−y S k and S K + y * S C respectively. In terms of the storage overhead, the user is required to store logn additional KEKs in Hur's scheme. In Xu's and our SRRS system, the user only needs to store the S K . For the token size, the above schemes have the same storage overhead. For the comparison of the computational complexity, we give the computational cost of different algorithms with the related works. Both Xu's scheme [29] and Hur's scheme [32] exploit the randomized convergent encryption, the key is selected by the file creator randomly, therefore, the computational cost of KeyGen are λ and y * log 2 x, and the computational cost of Enc are SE + hash + XOR and 2 * hash + SE + XOR respectively. In Ding's scheme [33] , the key is generated and managed by the third party, therefore, the computational cost of Setup is 1 * Exp, and KeyGen is 1 * BP. Our SRRS system exploits the convergent encryption and role re-encryption to obtain the re-encryption ciphertext, therefore, the computation cost of KeyGen is log n m, and Enc is 2 * hash + CE. With regard to the computational cost of ReEnc and KeyUp, Ding's scheme [33] uses the asymmetric encryption to generate the re-encryption ciphertext, Hur's scheme [32] uses symmetric encryption to generate the re-encryption ciphertext and key, our SRRS system uses the concatenation operation to generate the re-encryption ciphertext. Therefore, the computation costs of ReEnc in three schemes are 1 * BP, 2 * SE and Con, the computation cost of KeyUp are 1 * Exp + 1 * BP, (x − y)log x x−y , log n m + y * Con, respectively.
B. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we conduct a serial of simulation experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, the experiments are implemented on a PC with the following configurations: CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700 @ 3.40GHz 3.41GHz; RAM: 16.0GB; System type: 64-bit operating system, X64-based processor; OS: Ubuntu 12.04.4 LTS.
We invoke OpenSSL library for cryptographic operations, and use Java language with Eclipse application program on Linux. Specifically, we employ AES-256 and SHA-256 for the symmetric encryption and all hash algorithms, respectively.
We measure the computational cost of the basic algorithms and protocols of our proposed scheme. We run 200 times for each algorithm and protocol to obtain the average value, and use nine files with different sizes from 2MB to 512MB.
The token is the unique identifier of a file, and the computational cost of the number of token is related to the file size. We test the performance of token generation with different file sizes from 2MB to 512MB, as shown in Figure 7 (a). We use the AES-256 to test the performance Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms with different file sizes, as shown in Figure 7 (b) .
With the file size increasing, the computational cost of generating file token, symmetric encryption and decryption has significantly increased. When the file size is 512MB, the computational cost of generating token requires about 2.04s, Encrypt algorithm requires 4.11s to encrypt the original file into a ciphertext, and Decrypt algorithm requires 3.93s to decrypt the ciphertext to the original file.
We set the role key rkey as {256, 512, 1024} bits, set the block size as {1024, 256, 64, 16} bits and test the computational cost of ReEncrypt and ReDecrypt algorithms with different file sizes from 2MB to 512MB, as shown in Figure 7 (c) to Figure 7 (e).
The main computational cost of ReEncrypt algorithm is the runtime of concatenating the ciphertext blocks with the role key shares. When rkey is 1024 bits and the block size is 1024 bits, the computational cost reaches maximum. When rkey is 16 bits and the block size is 256 bits, the computational cost uncertain reaches minimum, which is also affected by the number of blocks. When rkey is 1024 bits, the block size is 1024 bits, with file size of 512 MB, ReEncrypt algorithm requires 8.05s to re-encrypt the ciphertext. When rkey is 16 bits, the block size is 256 bits, with file size of 512 MB, ReEncrypt algorithm requires 5.71s to re-encrypt the ciphertext.
The main computational cost of ReDecrypt algorithm is the runtime of splitting the ciphertext blocks with the role key shares, where the size of role key has little effect on the runtime. Therefore, we test the performance of re-decryption with different block sizes and file sizes, as shown in Figure 7 (f). When rkey is 1024 bits, with file size of 512 MB, ReDecrypt algorithm requires 7.47s to re-decrypt the re-encryption ciphertext.
We set the order of RAT with the set of {3, 5, 10}, we test the computational cost of RAT initialization and search with different number of elements, as shown in Figure 7 (g) and Figure 7 (h). With the number of elements increasing, the different orders of RAT have an increasing impact on the runtime of RAT initialization and search. When the order of RAT is 3 and the number of elements is 10 5 , the computational cost of RAT initialization and search is about 0.126s and 0.045s.
We set the security parameter κ as 66, S min as 64MB, the size of token l as in the set of {16, 64, 256, 1024} bits, the probability p as in the set of {0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95} and the false positive rate of the DCF p f as {0.001, 0.01, 0.1}. According to Equation (9) , the PoW challenges J is set to {102, 204, 509, 1017} based on the above values. And the size of blocks b is obtained, according to the values of l, S min , the size of input files and Equation (10) .
The main computational cost of DCF initialization is the runtime of InitDCF and InseDCF, which is related to the size of token and the false positive rate. When the file size reaches 64 MB, the inserted elements to the DCF reaches a fixed value, resulting in a decrease in curve growth. We test the computational cost of DCF initialization with different sizes of token and the false positive rates, as shown in Figure 8 (a) to Figure 8 (d) . When the false positive rate p f is 0.001 and token size is 16 bits, for file size of 512 MB, DCF initialization requires 9.89s. When the false positive rate p f is 0.1 and token size is 1024 bits, for file size of 512 MB, DCF initialization requires 0.09s.
The generation of PoW challenge is affected by the value of J , therefore, we test the computational cost of challenge generation with different value J based on the above analysis, as shown in Figure 8 (e). When value of J is 1017 and file size is 512 MB, the generation of PoW challenge requires 3.07s. After receiving the response, CSP verifies the correct of the responses res with different J challenges using the DCF retrieval. Finally, we test the computational cost of PoW verification with the different value of J , as shown in Figure 8 (f). when J is 1017, the PoW verification is about 0.074s, which is highly efficient.
VII. RELATED WORKS
In order to tackle the problem that the unauthorized users can access the user information only by supplying the hash value of the file. Halevi et al. [34] proposed the proof of ownership (PoW), which is an interaction protocol between client side VOLUME 7, 2019 and server side to verify the ownership of that client. In [34] , the client and server create a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) based on the source file, and use a challenge-response model to verify the correct of MHT path provided by the client. Ng et al. [38] proposed a private data deduplication in data storage, where a client held a private data proves to a server stored a summary string of the data that he/she is the owner of that data without revealing further information to the server. Xu et al. [29] proposed a cryptographic primitive to enhance the security of client-side deduplication in the bounded leakage setting where a certain amount of efficiently-extractable information about file F is leaked. In order to reduce the computational cost and improve the efficiency, Pietro and Sorniotti [39] proposed a s-PoW scheme, which requests some particular random bits of the file from the verified client. Blasco et al. [40] proposed a bf-PoW scheme based on the bloom filter, which requires the certain tokens from the verified client to achieve the proof of ownership efficiently. Through the security analysis, a wide range of benchmark tests and comparison of the existing schemes, the proposed scheme greatly reduces the cost of both the client and the cloud server. Gonzalez-Manzano and Orfila [35] proposed a ce-PoW scheme based on the convergent encryption (CE) [13] , which requires neither trusted third party nor the complex key management. The cloud server stores a four-tuples containing the encrypted blocks, challenge, response, and a list of client identifiers. The experimental evaluation shows the efficiency and feasibility of the proposed scheme.
In order to solve the unauthorized access in data deduplication, Puzio et al. [41] proposed a secure and efficient storage system called ClouDedup, which is based on the CE algorithm and access control mechanism, and achieves block-level data deduplication. Li et al. [42] proposed a CDStore scheme, which is based on the CE algorithm and convergent dispersal mechanism to achieve secure data deduplication, and saves nearly 70% of the storage overhead. Tang et al. [36] proposed a secure data deduplication scheme based on CP-ABE algorithm [43] in cloud. With a recursive algorithm and an additional randomness adding method, it can achieve the duplication check and secure deduplication. Li et al. [18] proposed a novel data deduplication scheme and gave a concept of hybrid cloud environment, where the generation of encryption keys is related to the corresponding privilege, the private cloud server is responsible for management and storage of the user's keys, and the public cloud server stores the ciphertext and performs the data deduplication. Xiong et al. [4] proposed a role symmetric encryption (RSE) algorithm, and constructed a role symmetric encryption PoW (RSE-PoW) scheme, which establishes a hierarchical role tree and utilizes the role access control mechanism to achieve authorized deduplication. Gonzalez-Manzano et al. [37] proposed an ase-PoW scheme in hierarchical environment, which uses a lightweight access control procedure to resist against the content guessing attack, where the encryption key is linked to the owner's attributes and calculated by the symmetric recursive encryption. However, the above data deduplication schemes do not take into account the key updating and user revocation. Kwon et al. [44] proposed a new deduplication scheme with multimedia data, which is based on randomized convergent encryption and privilege-based encryption to achieve authorized deduplication and user revocation. Li et al. [45] and Qin et al. [46] proposed a rekeying-aware encrypted deduplication (REED) system to achieve data deduplication and dynamic access control. Hur et al. [32] proposed a novel data deduplication scheme for the server-side, which uses the randomized convergent encryption algorithm and ownership group key distribution technique to achieve the authorized access and support security deduplication with ownership changes dynamically. Ding et al. [33] proposed a secure encrypted data deduplication scheme, which exploits the homomorphic encryption algorithm to achieve security data deduplication [47] , and supports ownership check and user revocation. However, the above schemes exploit the homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption with high computation cost.
To present the novelties of our system, a comparison of related works is depicted in Table 4 .
VIII. CONCLUSION
To process the massive cloud data efficiently, the cloud service providers widely perform data deduplication to reduce the occupation of storage space and the bandwidth consumption. In order to prevent privacy data leakage, achieve authorized deduplication and satisfy dynamic privilege updating and revoking, we proposed a novel secure role re-encryption system with authorized deduplication in cloud environment. In our proposed system, we firstly exploited the convergent encryption algorithm to prevent privacy data leakage and used the role re-encryption algorithm to achieve authorized deduplication efficiently. Specifically, we created the role authorized tree to manage the user's roles and the corresponding role keys, and introduced the management center to reduce the computation cost and management overhead of the client, and implement the dynamic updating of the authorized user's privilege. Furthermore, We exploit the dynamic count filters (DCF) to achieve the data updating and improve the retrieval of ownership verifying efficiency. Finally, the security analysis demonstrates the security of our proposed scheme, and the performance evaluation makes it clear that the proposed scheme is effective and efficient.
